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SHOULD THE STATES BE PERMITTED TO MAKE
COMPACTS WITHOUT THE CONSENT
OF CONGRESS?
ERNEST C. CARMAN
There has come into being since the Constitution of the United States
was adopted a decided enlargement of the twilight zone between affairs of
national interest and those entirely the concern of individual States; and
this zone may now be governed most efficiently by cooperative action of the
States directly interested. But the constitution provides that no State shall,
without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with'
another State.1 This provision had its genesis in the suspicion and distrust
of each other inherent among the thirteen States when the Constitution was
formulated; and particularly, in the fear of alliance between the larger states
to obtain control of the new Federal Government or otherwise to destroy the
equality which the smaller States sought to make secure. That these reasons
for requiring the consent of Congress-including the Senate where each
State has the same voting power-to the making of compacts between the
States have now disappeared will be denied by none.
And so it follows that the power of the States to enter into agreements or
compacts relating to matters of less than national concern, without the con-
sent of Congress, should now be restored. The word "restored" is advisedly
used because when the States achieved their independence, they acquired the
sum total of all sovereign power to make treaties, compacts or agreements
among themselves or with other nations ;2 and they used that sovereign power
freely during the few intervening years before the Constitution was adopted,3
and the power became subject to the consent of Congress. To be sure,
the restoration of such treaty making power among the States at this time
should be made subject to the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and
valid laws enacted by Congress. But this would still leave such compacts or
agreements clothed with as much continuity as inheres in treaties made be-
tween the United States and foreign powers; for an Act of Congress incon-
sistent with any prior treaty is a denunciation thereof and supersedes the
1U. S. CONST., Art. 1, § 9.2Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 657 at page 720 et seq. (1838).
'Delaware River treaty of 1783 between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, discussed in
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 14 Howard (U. S.) 80 (1852) ; Chesapeake
Bay treaty of 1785 between Maryland and Virginia discussed in Middlekauff v. Le
Compte, 149 Md. 621 (1926); treaty of Hartford (1786) between Massachusetts and
New York discussed in Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U. S. 65 (1925); treaty of
Beaufort between South Carolina and Georgia discussed in South Carolina v. Georgia,
93 U. S. 4 (1876). These treaties are still in force except as modified by the Federal
Constitution. Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155 (1894).
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treaty.4 The same power in Congress to enact laws overriding all conflicting
provisions of interstate compacts is ample to protect national interests against
any detrimental compacts that might be made between the States; and surely
no greater safeguard is needed. The Constitution and laws of the United
States "made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States" would still be "the supreme
law of the land"-anything in such compacts between the States to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Under the Constitution as now written, the cart is placed before the horse
so far as compacts between the States are involved. The consent of Congress
must be had before any such compact can become valid, no matter how.
localized its operation or effect may be. California cannot make an enforce-
able agreement with Arizona for cooperative action at joint expense to
eradicate a citrus fruit pest without asking the consent of the Congressmen
and Senators from Maine in Congress assembled, although obviously they
have not the slightest interest in such matter; and the procurement of their
consent, and of like consent of the Congressmen and Senators from many
other States, entails delay that may be fatal to the accomplishment of the
object sought and, in any event, imposes upon Congress a needless legislative
burden. The same observation applies with equal force to the making of a
compact between Louisiana and Arkansas to drain a mosquito-breeding swamp
that extends across their common boundary" line and substitute in its
place a healthful farm area; to a compact between Minnesota and Wisconsin
to prevent disastrous forest fires, or for uniformity in the inspection and
sanitation laws of the two States affecting dairy products marketed alike
from both States in the Twin Cities; to a compact between Connecticut and
Massachusetts for equitable diversion of the waters of the Connecticut
River for domestic use or for the joint construction and maintenance of
public works for the same purpose; to a compact between Montana, Wyo-
ming, and Idaho for conservation of their migratory bird and wild game
life; to a compact between New York and New Jersey for continuity of
public highway construction and maintenance at a cost apportioned between
them on the basis of beneficial use and enjoyment instead of geographical
location of their common boundary line; to a compact between Iowa and
Missouri for uniform regulation of motor vehicle traffic in adjacent areas
of the two States; and to other compacts for a variety of purposes appro-
priate to the better government of vast numbers of people living along the
two sides of artificial State lines but with no natural or logical division of
their community life and interests.
'Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 at page 271 (1898).
5See Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution, (1925) 34 YALE
L. J. 685; F. D. G. Ribble, National and State Cooperation Under the Commerce Clause
(1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 43.
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Again, if there now be removed the outmoded constitutional obstruction to
all interstate agreements, it is not difficult to envision the making of many
beneficial compacts which might be aptly described as regional in an in-
dustrial or economic sense, even when not so geographically. Of such
nature would be compacts for conservation of natural resources common to
more than one but not all of the States; and particularly resources of a
fugitive nature such as oil and gas. And similarly as to uniformity in manu-
facturing production localized in a few States, such as the textile industries
of New England and the old South. Or a planned economy in agricultural
production of the cotton-growing or wheat-producing States. And so on.
Nor would any lack of protection of the general public throughout the
United States result from such interstate compacts. Congress or the Su-
preme Court would promptly lay a restraining hand upon any compacts or
agreements between States unduly tending to foster monopoly or increase
costs to the consuming public of the United States as a whole, or retard the
general flow of interstate commerce, or otherwise operate to the public
detriment.
The desirability of freedom among. the States to make compacts in respect
to matters of local concern has been recognized by the Supreme Court, and
the doubtful doctrine of implied consent by Congress has been judicially in-
voked to give them validity.6 Similarly, the States themselves, without the
consent of Congress, have endeavored in some cases to get the same result
by reciprocal legislation 7 which, however, the Supreme Court apparently
construes as mere legislative declarations-not compacts of binding force
'Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503 (1893).
7Perhaps the most notable example of reciprocal legislation between the States is to
be found in the various Inheritance Tax Acts exempting intangible personal property
of non-residents if a like provision is made in the State where such non-residents reside
for the benefit, among others, of residents of the taxing State. California is typical.
Chapter 358 Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of California, 1935, Section 6,
paragraph 7, at page 1275.
But for an entirely different type of reciprocal legislation, see Chapter 94, SEssION
LAWS OF MINNESOTA, 1927, page 148 (drafted by the writer of this article, but of doubtful
constitutionality) entitled:
"An act reciprocally permitting citizens of adjoining States and of adjoining
Canadian provinces to operate their motor vehicles tax free upon the streets and
highways of this State under certain conditions prescribed by this act, if and
when like privileges in such adjoining states and provinces are extended to Minne-
sota motor vehicle owners similarly situated; also creating, offenses, fixing penalties
and civil remedies and prescribing rules of evidence."
If constitutional, this reciprocal legislation is now wholly or partly effective under
responsive legislation by all neighboring States except Manitoba. Chapter 444, LAWS OF
WIscoNSIN, 1931; Sections 4865 and 4866, CODE OF IOWA, 1931; Chapter 183 (Section 7)
SEssI N LAWs OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 1931; Chapters 193,and 194, LAWS oF NORTH DAKOTA,
1935 (reciprocity not mentioned); Chapter 54 (Section 19) STATUTES OF ONTARIO,
Canada, 1931 and Chapter 20, ibid., 1933; and in principle, but not extended across the
international border, in Chapter 19 (Section 7, paragraph 6) LAWS OF MANITOBA, 1930.
See Joseph R. Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in American States
(1937) 21 MINN L. REV. 371.
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or effect." Hence reciprocal tax laws, reciprocal criminal laws, and their en-
forcement, and even matters of local government adaptable to joint or con-
current action between neighboring counties on opposite sides of State lines
could be made more practical by interstate compacts without the consent of
Congress
Here, as elsewhere in the Constitution, restrictions upon State power and
limitations in national power the reasons for which have ceased to exist,
should be abolished and revised restrictions or grants substituted in their
place.
The last paragraph of Section 10 in Article I of the Constitution should
now be amended to read as follows:
"No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any
agreement or compact with a foreign power, or engage in war unless
actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
All compacts and agreements between the States shall be subordinate
to this Constitution and to all conflicting or inconsistent laws of Congress
at any time enacted pursuant thereto; and no such compact shall cover
any subject of national concern."
But when the power of the States to make such compacts without the
consent of Congress is thus restored then, as a logical corollary thereto, the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States should be
extended to include, not merely the decision of legal cases or controversies
between the States arising from such compacts, but to declaratory and
arbitral and advisory relief as well as the strictly judicial relief now to be
had ;1O all of these should be available not only to the signatories to such
compacts but also to the United States, at any time, and to any State claim-
ing to have an interest sufficient to warrant the Supreme Court in permitting
intervention by such State.
This would afford a fitting substitute for the loss by the States under the
Constitution of the original sovereign power, in case of disagreement, to
arbitrate, or to exert economic pressure, or to fight. It would relieve States
unable to agree upon their respective rights under any compact from the
predicament of also being unable to do anything about it until a wrong is
committed or immediately threatened by one of them. A declaration of
rights before injury is done, and as a guide for doing the proper thing, is
'Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 520 (1893).
'Very recent reciprocal legislation which might be either superseded or supple-
mented by interstate compacts, if the same could be made without the consent of
Congress, is to be found in the New York Insurance Law (Sections 406a-406h) re-
lating to liquidation of interstate insurers which is discussed in (1937) 37 COL. L. REv.
1031.
20The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of June 14, 1934 applies only to controversies
of a justiciable nature. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288
at page 325 (1936).
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preferable in sovereign relations to a leap in the dark followed by a judg-
ment setting forth that it was either all right or all wrong. This is particu-
larly so when projects are to be undertaken involving large expenditures of
public money.
The complete disposal of a controversy arising from any such compact
through one submission to the Supreme Court would be less burdensome
and much less dilatory than a long series of cases through the years to
get the same results, piecemeal and at random. It would also be more busi-
nesslike, and less inclined to keep alive the rancor and ill-will that thrives in
an endless controversy among sovereigns the same as among individuals.
Accordingly, Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution should be
amended by adding at the end thereof this further provision:
"The supreme court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
in all matters or controversies arising from compacts or agreements
between the States; including arbitral and declaratory relief and relief
by advisory interpretation, which it'shall be the duty of the court always
to grant upon the petition of any interested State or of the United
States."
By such amendments-the balance between State and Federal power may
be revised and set most definitely upon the principles of locality and gen-
erality which Abraham Lincoln"l conceived to be the guiding star for proper
distribution of sovereignty between the States and the United States.
And in this way the widely separated States of the far flung American
Union will be permitted to adapt themselves to regional arrangements with
their neighboring States, or to coordination of industrial or agricultural or
other pursuits with more distant States having a common interest therein,
but of such a nature that neither the remaining States nor the United States
need have any concern therewith.
"See Lincoln's message to a special session of Congress on July 4, 1861. Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, Volume VII, page 3229, published by Bureau of National
Literature, Inc., New York. In that message President Lincoln said:
"This relative matter of national power and State 'rights,' as a principle, is no
other than the principle of generality and locality. Whatever concerns the whole
should be confided to the whole-to the General Government-while whatever con-
cerns only the State should be left exclusively to the State. This is all there is
of original principle about it."
The late Chief Justice William Howard Taft is reported to have said that no man
ever lived who would have made an abler Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court than Abraham Lincoln. See Journal of American Bar Association, March, 1937,
at page 171.
